Larae Jensen , nka Larae Thorpe v. Raymond Jensen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
Larae Jensen , nka Larae Thorpe v. Raymond Jensen
: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Scott Lundberg No. 2020 Sally B. McMinimee No. 5316 Don R. Schow No. 5343 PRINCE,
YEATES & GELDZAHLER; Attorney for Appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, Olsen, Mciff and Chamberlain Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Jensen v. Jensen, No. 20070312 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/173
LN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM A. JENSEN 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
SONJA JENSEN 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070312 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Richard S. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
Bart J. Johnsen (7068) 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
, 0 # » 
638 :377580vl 
n , 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WILLIAM A. JENSEN 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
SONJA JENSEN 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070312 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
Richard S. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
Bart J. Johnson (7068) 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
36 South State Street, Suite 1900 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
638 :377580vl 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
Nature of the Case 4 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 6 
Statement of Relevant Facts 7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT 
WHEN AWARDING MS. JENSEN $2,581.00 PER MONTH 
ALIMONY FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS 9 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DD3 NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SETTING ASIDE THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO SELL 
THE HOME AND DIVIDING THE EQUITY BASED UPON THE 
APPRAISED VALUE 15 
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DEALT WITH THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES 17 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ADJUSTED THE 
DIVISION OF THE REAL PROPERTY EQUITY TO 
COMPENSATE MR. JENSEN FOR PAYMENTS ON THE 
ARIZONA MORTGAGE DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE 
ACTION 19 
V. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DENffiD MS. JENSEN'S 
REQUEST FOR RETROACTIVE ALIMONY 20 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DD3 NOT ERR IN NOT SETTING ASD3E A 
PORTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 MINUTE ENTRY 21 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT HAD A REASONABLE BASIS TO DENY AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 22 
638 377580v] 
ii 
CONCLUSION 23 
iii 
638 :377580vl 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Beynon v. Clah. 2004 UT App 268 3, 21, 23 
Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 3, 21 
Bradford v. Bradford, 199 UT App 373, 993 P.2d 887 2 
Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 1, 3, 10 
Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 11 
Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 3, 22 
Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562 (Utah 1988) 1, 15, 16 
Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah 1987) 16 
Davis v. Davis. 2003 UT App. 282, 76 P.3d 716 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 17, 20 
Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT App 205 2, 15, 16 
Johnson v. Higlev, 1999 UT App 278, 989 P.2d 61 3, 21, 23 
Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, 9 P.3d 171 10 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998) 4,22 
Nunlev v. Nunlev, 757 P.2d 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 1, 15, 16 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987 16 
Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306 10 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 1 
RULES 
Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1) 1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 17, 18 
iv 
638 :377580vl 
Utah R Civ. P. 60 21 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 22 
638 377580vl 
V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Respondent/Appellant is required to provide 
a statement of each issue for review along with "the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority[.]" Appellant's Statement of the Issues Presented for Review 
alleges a standard of review but fails to cite any supporting authority for the alleged 
standard of review. 
I. The trial court made adequate findings of fact when awarding Ms. Jensen 
$2,581.00 per month alimony for a period of five years. 
Standard of Review: 'Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony, and determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated". Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App. 282, ^]7, 
76 P.3d 716 (alterations omitted)(quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). 
II. The trial court did not abuse it discretion in setting aside the stipulation of 
the parties to sell the home and divide the equity based upon the appraised value. 
Standard of Review: "Property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in 
divorce proceedings." Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), citing 
Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1988) ("a property settlement agreement is 
638 :377580v] 
not binding upon the trial court in a divorce action"). "It is well recognized that the 
parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce action, although advisory and usually 
followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessarily binding 
on the trial court. It is only a recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to 
be fair and reasonable." Dayton v. Dayton. 2003 UT App 205, ^2. 
III. The trial court appropriately dealt with the personal property of the parties. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of a property division will only 
be changed if there was a "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion". Davis 
v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282 ^8, 76 P.3d 716 (quoting Bradford v. Bradford, 199 UT App 
373, H 25, 993 P.2d 887). 
IV. The trial court appropriately adjusted the division of the real property 
equity to compensate Mr. Jensen for payments on the Arizona mortgage during the 
pendency of the action. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of a property division will only 
be changed if there was a "misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a 
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion". Davis 
v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282 1]8, 76 P.3d 716 (quoting Bradford v. Bradford, 199 UT App 
373,125, 993 P.2d 887). 
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V. The trial court appropriately denied Ms. Jensen's request for retroactive 
alimony based upon the lack of evidence to support her claim. 
Standard of Review: 'Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining 
alimony, and determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated". Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App. 282, ^ }7, 
76 P.3d 716 (alterations omitted)(quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877. 879 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). "Where an appellant fails to satisfy the marshaling requirement, we are 
required to assume that the findings of the court are supported by the evidence." Beynon 
v. Clah, 2004 UT App 268 (citing Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278, K 37, 989 P.2d 
61). 
VI. The trial court correctly exercised its broad discretion in denying Ms. 
Jensen's Rule 60 Motion. 
Standard of Review: The trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a 
motion for relief from judgment under Subdivision (b), and its determination will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
VII. The trial court had a reasonable basis to deny an award of attorney fees. 
Standard of Review: The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof 
rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 
947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable 
638 :377580vl 
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basis for the decision. Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 
1998) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Jensen appeals the Decree of Divorce entered in a divorce action that was 
filed in 2003. The parties had been married approximately 16 years and had two 
children. At the time of the divorce filing, Mr. Jensen had custody of the parties' two 
teenage daughters as well as possession of the parties' home in Murray. At that time, Mr. 
Jensen was employed earning $10,000.00 per month and Ms. Jensen was receiving 
disability payments of approximately $800.00 per month plus some amounts for lump 
sum settlements. Additionally, at that time the parties had a stock account and cash 
assets. 
Despite the lack of relationship with her teenage daughters, Ms. Jensen filed 
numerous motions in regard to parent-time and sought a custody evaluation. Ms. Jensen 
filed motions to disqualify the custody evaluator whom she had nominated and had 
appointed by the Court. Ms. Jensen asked the Court for a two week trial to litigate the 
issue of custody of a 15-year-old and a 17-year-old despite the evaluator's 
recommendation contrary to Ms. Jensen's position. Subsequently, the parties stipulated 
that Mr. Jensen would have sole custody of the parties' daughters and that Ms. Jensen 
would have parent-time as she and the remaining minor child could agree. The trial was 
638:377580vl 
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reduced from the two weeks scheduled to two days to deal with the issues of alimony and 
property division. 
Prior to the trial. Mr. Jensen discovered that Ms. Jensen was employed by a 
company called CRS where she was working under an assumed name. Ms. Jensen's job 
was to recruit persons who had been defrauded by Ms. Jensen's father into participating 
in an attempt to bypass the Trustee who had been court-appointed to liquidate the assets 
of her father's former company. Further. Ms. Jensen previously testified that she had 
been employed in a multi level marketing company working 40 hours per week. 
After hearing and reviewing the evidence over the course of a two day trial as well 
as closing arguments, the trial court made detailed findings awarding Ms. Jensen alimony 
in the amount of $2,581.00 for a period of five years. The court valued the marital real 
property based upon the appraised value of the properties and divided the equity equally. 
The trial court adjusted the property division in the form of the equity from the real 
property by an amount equal to one-half the mortgage payments made by Mr. Jensen for 
the Arizona condominium during the time that issue was specifically reserved and while 
Ms. Jensen had exclusive use and possession of the condominium. The trial court 
determined that insufficient evidence was presented as to the value of the personal 
property and so ordered the personal properly sold. The trial court divided equally the 
retirement plans of the parties. The trial court found that insufficient evidence had been 
presented by Ms. Jensen in connection with her claim for retroactive alimony to a time 
prior to the temporary alimony order and found that there was insufficient evidence to 
5 
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support an award of attorney fees to either party even though both parties sought an 
award of fees. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Divorce on August 21, 2003. R. 1-6. 
Respondent filed an Answer and Counter-Petition on March 31. 2004. R. 57-61. A 
Recommendation and Order dealing with custody and parent-time and reserving further 
financial issues was entered on April 26. 2004. R. 182-185. The court entered a 
Recommendation and Order on August 24, 2004 requiring Petitioner to pay to 
Respondent the monthly sum of $2,859.00 for temporary alimony effective June 11, 
2004. R. 661-663. The Court entered a Recommendation and Order on February 7, 2006 
requiring Petitioner to pay the mortgage payment on the Arizona condominium and 
reserving for trial reapportionment of those payments. R. 1374-1376. On June 28 and 
29, 2006 the trial court heard testimony and received evidence. On June 29, 2006 the 
parties stipulated that the Murray home would be immediately sold and the proceeds 
divided. T. 422-426. On July 18, 2006 Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Stipulation. 
R. 1444-1446. On July 29, 2006 the trial court heard closing arguments from the parties. 
On August 21, 2006 the trial court announced its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
R. 1456-1457. On the 29th day of September, 2006 the court entered a Minute Entry 
granting Mr. Jensen's Motion to Set Aside Stipulation. R. 1543-1544. On February 26, 
2007 Respondent filed a Motion to Set Aside portions of the Minute Entry. R. 1557-
1560. On April 2, 2007 the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
638:377580vl 
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Law (R. 1575-1590) and a Decree of Divorce. R. 1595-1599. On April 12, 2007 
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. R. 1600-1601. 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. The parties to this action were married in December. 1987 and separated in 
June, 2003. R. 1-6. 
2. The parties are parents of two daughters, Johanna born the 9th day of 
August, 1988, and Amanda, born the 1st day of April, 1990. R. 2. 
3. The court appointed a custody evaluator to perform a custody evaluation. 
R491-494. 
4. Based upon the results of the custody evaluation, the parties stipulated that 
Mr. Jensen would be awarded primary legal and physical custody of the parties' minor 
child and Ms. Jensen would have parent-time as she and the remaining minor child could 
agree. R. 1576^9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made adequate findings in regard to the required elements of an 
alimony analysis. The trial court analyzed Ms. Jensen's needs and ability to meet her 
needs as well as Mr. Jensen's ability to pay. The trial court made specific findings 
concerning Ms. Jensen's monthly needs and that Ms. Jensen had overstated and 
exaggerated certain claims for expenses. The trial court also made specific findings as to 
Ms. Jensen's ability to meet her needs when imputing income to her. Ms. Jensen fails to 
638 377580vl 
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marshal any evidence to show that the factual findings of the trial court are clearly 
erroneous. 
The trial court correctly set aside the stipulation to immediately sell the home 
where Mr. Jensen and the minor child resided and appropriately valued the home 
consistent with the appraised value. Trial courts have broad discretion to deal with 
property in a divorce action. The trial court heard evidence of the value of the home by 
way of a certified appraisal. The trial court rejected the value claimed by Ms. Jensen and 
valued the home pursuant to the appraisal. The trial court determined that the best 
interests of the minor child were served by granting Mr. Jensen's motion to set aside the 
stipulation to immediately sell the home where he and the minor child resided. Ms. 
Jensen fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its broad discretion. 
The trial court correctly determined that there was insufficient evidence as to the 
value of the parties' personal property and ordered that the personal property would be 
sold and the proceeds divided equally. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal any evidence to 
show that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in regard to the property 
division. 
The trial court appropriately considered that Mr. Jensen had made the payments on 
the Arizona condominium during the pendency of the matter while Ms. Jensen had 
exclusive use and possession of the property. The issue of the apportionment of those 
payments was specifically reserved as a trial issue. The trial court adjusted the division 
of the equity in the marital property to repay Mr. Jensen one-half of those payments. Ms. 
638:377580vl 
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clearly erroneous and that the trial court abused its discretion in regard to the property 
division. 
The trial court correctly determined that Ms. Jensen failed to present adequate 
evidence supporting her claim for retroactive alimony. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal 
any evidence to demonstrate that the trial court's finding that there was insufficient 
evidence was clearly erroneous. 
The trial court exercised its broad discretion in denying Ms. Jensen's Rule 60 
Motion. Ms. Jensen has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. 
Additionally, the question is so insubstantial as to warrant no further review. 
The trial court correctly determined that no attorney fees were to be awarded to 
either party. Each party requested fees arguing they were the prevailing party. The trial 
court denied each party's request for fees, finding that there was insufficient evidence to 
support an award of fees. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal any evidence to demonstrate 
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. Further, Ms. Jensen has failed to 
establish that the trial court abused its discretion in its failure to award fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT 
WHEN AWARDING MS. JENSEN $2,581.00 PER MONTH ALIMONY FOR A 
PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony, and 
determinations of alimony will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse 
9 
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of discretion is demonstrated**. Davis v. Davis. 2003 UT App. 282. %1. 76 P.3d 716 
(alterations omitted)(quoting Breinholt v. Breinholt. 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). "In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court 
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient 
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the 
marriage." Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^6, 974 P.2d 306. "If these factors have 
been considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 
UT App 236, ^26, 9 P.3d 171. 
In this case, the trial court made specific findings concerning each of the required 
elements in making an award of alimony. Specifically, the trial court found that Ms. 
Jensen had reasonable monthly needs of $4,000.00. 
Respondent has monthly needs of $4,000.00. Respondent set forth her 
needs in her Exhibit 36 at $4,704.00, not including payment of debt. The 
Court finds that Respondent failed to demonstrate the existence of much of 
her claimed debt and failed to demonstrate that she would not be able to 
satisfy any actual debt from her share of the division of assets. As such, no 
monthly debt payments are included in Respondent's monthly needs. The 
Court reduces Respondent's claimed needs of $4,704.00 by $704.00 finding 
that claimed expenses for window cleaning, food and household supplies, 
personal hygiene, health and auto insurance, an automobile lease that she 
does not have, clothing, psychiatrist, storage, and health club are overstated 
and exaggerated. As such, the Court finds that Respondent's reasonable 
monthly needs are $4,000.00 and after deduction of $1,409.00 per month 
Respondent has a monthly shortfall of $2,581.00. 
R. 1581 ^35. Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court failed to indicate how it arrived at the 
$4,000.00 per month because that amount was not consistent with Ms. Jensen's argument 
10 
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at tna! as to her monthJv needs. However, a review of the trial court s flndin° c!earlv 
shows that, for alimony purposes, the court determined that Ms. Jensen's claimed debt 
payments would not be included and that her monthly expenses would be reduced by 
$704.00 for overstated and exaggerated expenses. Ms. Jensen's argument that the trial 
court failed to make a specific finding is inaccurate. 
To the extent that Ms. Jensen is arguing that the trial court's finding as to her 
monthly needs is unsupported by the evidence presented, as the party seeking to 
challenge the finding of fact Ms. Jensen is obligated to marshal the evidence to show that 
the finding of fact is unsupported by the evidence before the court. "An appellant must 
first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177. An 
appellant "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at 
l[]77. Additionally, a party cannot just "re-argue the factual case [she] presented in the 
trial court." IdL In this case, Ms. Jensen merely re-argues her evidence presented at trial 
and concludes that the trial court should have made a different determination. Ms. Jensen 
argues that the trial court should have relied on a different exhibit than the one the trial 
court relied on despite the fact that the exhibit (Exhibit 36) was prepared by Ms. Jensen 
and offered by Ms. Jensen as illustrative of her testimony as to her current expected 
expenses. T. 402. The trial court considered the exhibits offered, including the exhibit 
638:377580vl 
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that Ms. Jensen argues on appeal it should have relied on. and Ms. Jensen's testimony 
then made detailed findings of fact as to the calculation of Ms. Jensen's monthly needs. 
Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal any evidence to show that the finding of fact made by 
the trial court is clearly erroneous. 
Next. Ms. Jensen claims that the trial court erred by imputing income to her in an 
amount consistent with her most recent employment rather than at just minimum wage. 
Ms. Jensen's argument is that because the Commissioner imputed only minimum wage to 
her for purposes of the temporary alimony award, therefore, the trial court erred by 
imputing income to her in a higher amount. The trial court made detailed findings 
indicating that Ms. Jensen was underemployed. The trial court considered the testimony 
of Ms. Jensen's expert witnesses and determined that her claimed disability from 
depression was insufficient to render Ms. Jensen incapable of work. 
Respondent is currently unemployed and/or underemployed. 
Respondent claims that she suffers from depression which precludes her 
from working at all. The Court finds that Respondent suffers from a 
situational depression consistent with the testimony of Dr. Mausberg. 
Respondent's situation that causes the depression is the current divorce 
action and by resolution of the divorce action, the depression will be 
reduced. Additionally, Dr. Mausberg testified, and the Court finds credible, 
that the depression is not permanent or chronic and that Respondent can 
obtain counseling and medication that helps to relieve the depression. 
The Court further finds that whatever depression Respondent suffers 
from does not render her unable to work. The Court finds that she has the 
ability to work and that she has the ability to function. Respondent has the 
ability to work on her father's affairs, the ability to travel, and the ability to 
maintain a household. The Court finds that these abilities demonstrate her 
ability to engage in employment. 
12 
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R. 1580 Tnj32 & 33. Further, the trial court considered the evidence before it that during 
the pendency of the divorce action, Ms. Jensen worked full time as a distributor for a 
vitamin company, T. 74-76, that she was not seeking employment because of the divorce 
action and her other lawsuits, T. 79-8 L that she previously testified that she did not suffer 
from depression that rendered her unable to work, T. 82, that she had been working under 
an assumed name for a company involved in her father's business, T. 105-106, and that 
she had instructed her mother to keep information as to her working secret so as to not 
lose her alimony. T. 108. The trial court also considered the direct contradictions 
between Ms. Jensen's deposition testimony and her trial testimony in regard to her 
employment and the reasons why she did not have employment. Based upon that 
evidence, the trial court made detailed findings of fact that Ms. Jensen was in fact capable 
of employment. R. 1580 ^j32 & 33. Ms. Jensen fails to marshal any evidence to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact in regard to Ms. Jensen's 
underemployment are clearly erroneous. 
Ms. Jensen then argues that the amount the trial court imputed to her is erroneous 
because her employment with Southwest Airlines was of short duration. Ms. Jensen 
argues that the short duration of the employment is dispositive of her claim that the trial 
court erred. Once again, the trial court made a detailed finding with regard to the 
determination to impute income to Ms. Jensen in that amount. 
The Court finds that income should be imputed to Respondent based upon 
her past employment with Southwest Airlines where she earned $8.25 per 
hour. Although during the marriage Respondent was not generally 
employed outside the home, she was employed at points in time and was 
13 
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employed by Southwest Airlines. Although the employment with 
Southwest was of a fairly short duration, the Court finds that employment 
to be the benchmark of her ability to earn an income and finds that she can 
earn, and will be imputed with, income of $8.25 per hour which equals 
$1,409.00 per month. 
R. 1581 T|34. Ms. Jensen fails again to marshal the evidence to show that there is no 
support for the imputation of income at an amount higher than minimum wage. The trial 
court considered the testimony of Ms. Jensen concerning her full time employment 
selling vitamins and her testimony that she had been working under an assumed name in 
conjunction with the evidence that the job, to which Ms. Jensen had admitted, she had 
earned $8.25 per hour. Ms. Jensen has failed to demonstrate why the trial court's 
findings are without evidentiary support and thus are clearly erroneous. 
Finally, Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting an 
alimony award for a period of five years. The trial court made a detailed finding as to the 
basis for setting the award for a definite time frame. 
The Court finds that alimony to Respondent shall be awarded for a period 
of five years from the date of the Court's oral ruling, August 21, 2006. The 
Court finds that due to the age of the parties that if the alimony period were 
longer than five years, Respondent would become older and rely only on 
the alimony for her support and that such reliance would be a disservice to 
her. The Court finds that Respondent has the ability to use the period of 
five years to put her house in order and be able to support herself at that 
time. 
R. 1581-82 ^36. Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court abused its discretion in setting a 
definite period for alimony yet fails to marshal any evidence to show that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. A trial court's considerable discretion will not be 
14 
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overturned absent clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion. Davis. 2003 UT App. 
282 at 1^7. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SETTING ASIDE THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES TO SELL THE 
HOME AND DIVIDING THE EQUITY BASED UPON THE APPRAISED VALUE 
Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court erred by setting aside the stipulation to 
immediately sell the Murray home because it failed to articulate justifiable cause for 
granting the motion to set aside the stipulation. Utah law abounds with support for the 
proposition that a trial court retains authority to accept or reject the stipulation of parties 
in any divorce proceeding. "Property settlements are not binding upon trial courts in 
divorce proceedings." Nunley v. Nunley, 757 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), citing 
Clausen v. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1988) ("a property settlement agreement is 
not binding upon the trial court in a divorce action"). "It is well recognized that the 
parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce action, although advisory and usually 
followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessarily binding 
on the trial court. It is only a recommendation to be adhered to if the court believes it to 
be fair and reasonable." Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT App 205, ^2. Trial courts have 
discretion to invalidate settlement agreements made by divorcing parties on grounds that 
the property allocation is inequitable. See, e.g., Nunley, 757 P.2d at 475 (affirming trial 
court's rejection of divorce settlement agreement where settlement agreement was 
inequitable); Clausen, 675 P.2d at 565 (affirming trial court's rejection of divorce 
settlement agreement that inequitably divided real property acquired during the 
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marriage); Colmari v. Column. 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah 1987) (no abuse of discretion in 
trial court's decision to disregard property settlement agreement made in anticipation of 
divorce). 'Thus, the general principle derived from our case law is that spouses...may 
make binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as 
the negotiations are conducted in good faith . . . and do not unreasonably constrain the 
court's equitable and statutory duties.'* Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75 ^ 25, 984 P.2d 987, 
994-95. 
The trial court has wide latitude in this area and its decision to vacate the terms of 
divorcing parties' stipulation or settlement agreement will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Nunjey, 757 P.2d at 475; Clausen, 675 P.2d 
at 565; Colrnan, 743 P.2d at 789; Dayton, 2003 UT App. 205 at ^2 ("This court reviews a 
trial court's decision to modify a stipulated division of property in a divorce action for an 
abuse of discretion"). In this case, Mr. Jensen moved the Court to reject the parties' 
stipulation to immediately sell the Murray home due to the best interests of the parties' 
remaining minor child. Ms. Jensen filed no opposition to the motion and the Court 
determined that the best interests of the minor child were served by delaying any required 
sale of the real property. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal any evidence to support her 
assertion that the trial court did not have any justifiable basis to set aside the stipulation 
of the parties. 
Ms. Jensen further argues that the trial court erred in valuing the Murray home at 
$440,000.00 which was consistent with the appraised value rather than at $609,000.00 
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which was the value testified to by Ms. Jensen's real estate agent. When reviewing a 
finding of fact, any questions going to the credibility of a witness's testimony are 
resolved in favor of the fact-finder's conclusions unless clearly erroneous. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). In this case, the trial court had a stipulated appraisal performed by Jerry 
Weber, a licensed appraiser, versus the testimony of Ms. Jensen's real estate agent who is 
not an appraiser. The trial court found that the appraised value represented the 
appropriate value of the Murray home. Noteworthy is that the Arizona condominium was 
valued by using a stipulated appraisal. Ms. Jensen fails to marshal any evidence to show 
that the trial court's determination to value the home based upon the appraisal rather than 
the real estate agent's testimony is clearly erroneous. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DEALT WITH THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES 
A trial court's property division will only be changed if there was a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Davis, 2003 UT App. 282 at j^8. 
In this case, the trial court found that "there is insufficient information to place a 
specific value on the items of personal property, household furniture, and appliances." R. 
1578 [^20. Due to the lack of information as to value of the personal property, the trial 
court ordered everything to be sold and the proceeds divided equally. R. 1579 ^]24. To 
support her claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the property to be 
sold, Ms. Jensen relies solely on her argument that, because she submitted a document 
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from 2002 wherein the parties had listed a value of household and personal assets at 
$100,000.00, all items in Mr. Jensen's possession are therefore worth $100,000.00. No 
other evidence was submitted to the trial court in regard to personal property values 
except Ms. Jensen's testimony that she believed that the personal property in Mr. 
Jensen's possession was worth $100,000.00. When reviewing a finding of fact, any 
questions going to the credibility of a witness's testimony are resolved in favor of the 
fact-finder's conclusions unless clearly erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Ms. Jensen 
argues that the trial court's finding of fact that there was insufficient information as to 
values was clearly erroneous because the trial court failed to believe her testimony. Ms. 
Jensen has failed to marshal any facts to show that the trial court's finding that there was 
insufficient evidence to value the property is clearly erroneous. 
Ms. Jensen advances no support for her argument that the trial court's order that 
the personal property would be sold and the proceeds divided equally is an abuse of its 
discretion except her argument that the evidence should have been sufficient for the court 
to value the property and offset those values between the parties. The trial court, 
however, specifically found that there was insufficient information presented to the court 
to allow it to value the personal property based upon a determination of Ms. Jensen's 
credibility. Ms. Jensen advances no other argument to indicate that a trial court ordering 
personal property to be sold is an abuse of discretion. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY ADJUSTED THE DIVISION OF 
THE REAL PROPERTY EQUITY TO COMPENSATE MR. JENSEN FOR 
PAYMENTS ON THE ARIZONA MORTGAGE DURING THE PENDENCY OF 
THE ACTION 
Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court erred by requiring her to reimburse Mr. 
Jensen for one-half the payments he made on the Arizona condominium during the period 
of the temporary order. The trial court made a specific finding that 
On February 7. 2006 the Court entered a Recommendation and Order that 
required Petitioner to pay the monthly mortgage on the Arizona condo 
along with the necessary home owner's fees. The Order specifically 
reserved for trial the issue of the final apportionment of the payments made 
by the Petitioner on the condo. During the period when the issue was 
reserved, Petitioner paid $26,304.84 in monthly mortgage payments and 
home owner's association fees. The Court finds that Respondent should 
repay to Petitioner one-half the payments made by him for the Arizona 
condo because she had exclusive use and possession of that residence 
during that time. The Court finds that this sum shall be paid to Petitioner at 
the time the parties settle the division of the equity in the real property. 
R. 1582-83H40. 
To support her claim that the trial court erred by requiring her to repay one-half 
the payments made by Mr. Jensen in the final property division, Ms. Jensen re-argues her 
claim that she should have been awarded a higher amount of permanent alimony and that 
she should have been awarded retroactive alimony. (She also argues that the payment 
was ordered as "temporary alimony" despite the fact that the Order does not so indicate.) 
She further argues that despite the fact that the issue of the payments was specifically 
reserved, the trial court could not actually deal with that issue because, if it did, it would 
have to retroactively modify the temporary order on alimony. However, the real issue is 
a property division issue. The trial court found that it was appropriate to adjust the 
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division of the equity in the marital residences to reimburse Mr. Jensen for payments he 
made toward the Arizona property while Ms. Jensen had exclusive use and possession of 
the property. The issue of the apportionment of the payments made for the condominium 
was specifically reserved for trial. R. 1367-68. A trial court's determination of a 
property division will only be changed if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. Davis, 2003 UT App. 282 at ^|8. The issue of the 
apportionment of the payments made by Mr. Jensen was clearly reserved for adjudication 
by the trial court. The trial court adjudicated the issue. Ms. Jensen complains that she 
does not like the result but fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in 
fashioning an equitable property division. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DENIED MS. JENSEN'S 
REQUEST FOR RETROACTIVE ALIMONY 
Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request 
for retroactive alimony. Specifically, Ms. Jensen argues that the trial court should have 
required Mr. Jensen to pay to Ms. Jensen temporary alimony prior to the court's 
temporary alimony award. Ms. Jensen argues that prior to the temporary order for 
alimony there was no temporary order for alimony and as such the trial court should go 
back and make the temporary order effective on an earlier date. Ms. Jensen's basis for 
such a claim is contained in her testimony wherein she testified that she did not receive 
temporary alimony prior to the entry of the temporary alimony order and that she 
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calculated how much she should have been paid had the temporary alimony order been 
effective a year earlier. T. 404-405. The trial court denied Ms. Jensen's request for 
retroactive alimony by finding that "Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate a reason why the Court should award retroactive alimony and as such no 
retroactive alimony will be awarded.v R. 1582 ]]39. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal any 
facts to show that the trial court's finding that she failed to present sufficient evidence as 
to a reason is without factual support. "Where an appellant fails to satisfy the marshaling 
requirement, we are required to assume that the findings of the court are supported by the 
evidence/' Beynon v. Clah, 2004 UT App 268 (citing Johnson v. Higley. 1999 UT App 
278, |^ 37, 989 P.2d 61). Because Ms. Jensen failed to present any evidence as to the 
issue of retroactive alimony other than her exhibit that merely calculated what the total 
would have been had the temporary order been effective earlier, the trial court's finding 
that she had failed to present sufficient evidence as to the issue is supported by the 
evidence. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT SETTING ASIDE A 
PORTION OF THE SEPTEMBER 29, 2006 MINUTE ENTRY 
Ms. Jensen argues that pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60 the trial court was required 
to set aside the portion of the Minute Entry dated September 29, 2006 because the trial 
court erred in including language that there "is no opposition to the motion in the record." 
R. 1544. A trial court has broad discretion with regard to a Rule 60 Motion and its 
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 
P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Ms. Jensen has failed to present any evidence 
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that the trial court abused its discretion in denying: her Rule 60(b) Motion. Further, the 
issue of the language in a minute entry subsequent to the trial but prior to the final Decree 
of Divorce is so insubstantial as to warrant no further review. 
VIL THE TRIAL COURT HAD A REASONABLE BASIS TO DENY AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1998). Ms. Jensen 
argues that she should have been awarded attorney fees on the issues of alimony and 
property division because she was the prevailing party. Ms. Jensen's argument that she 
was the prevailing party is made in the same brief as her appeal of the court's decision 
concerning those very issues of alimony and property division. The trial court found that 
there was insufficient evidence to determine the reasonableness and necessity of the fees 
and therefore no fees were awarded. R. 1584 ^48. Each party requested an award of fees 
for the litigation that culminated in the trial. The trial court denied each party's request 
for fees. Ms. Jensen appeals the trial court's decision to deny her request for fees. A trial 
court may award attorney fees in a domestic matter. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3. The 
decision to award fees is within the trial court's sound discretion. See Childs, at 947. 
The trial court declined to award either party any fees. Ms. Jensen has failed to marshal 
any facts to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the decision. "Where an 
appellant fails to satisfy the marshaling requirement, we are required to assume that the 
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findings of the court are supported by the evidence/ Beynon v Clah. 2004 UT Ann 268 
(citing Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 278. U 37, 989 P.2d 61) As such, the finding of 
the trial court that there was insufficient evidence to award attorney fees to either party is 
supported by the evidence. By finding that there was insufficient evidence to award 
attorney fees, the trial court articulated a reasonable basis for the denial of the request for 
fees. Ms. Jensen has failed to demonstrate that the trial court did not have a reasonable 
basis for its determination and thus has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the order of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 46 day of March, 2008. 
&McCARTHY 
Jonnsen 
horney for Petitioner/Appellee 
638 377580vl 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ d a y of March. 2008. two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES was mailed, first class postage affixed to: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & NEMELKA 
6806 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellan 
638 377580v] 
24 
